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for a purpose foreign to the attachment, but was related 
directly to the effect of the entry of judgment on its continu-
ance. The fact that judgment had been entered was not 
recited merely incidentally, but as the very basis for the 
intended motion. Defendant may have been premature in 
noticing her motion to dissolve the attachment, but by doing 
so she gave plaintiff all the notice of the entry of judgment 
to ·which he was entitled. When he failed within five days to 
perfect an appeal from the judgment, defendant was entitled 
to have the attachment dissolved. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
'27, 1954. Carter, J., and rrraynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22341. In Bank. Jan. 5, 1954.] 
CHAH,LES Bl~YJijRBACH, Appellant, v. JUNO OIL COM-
PANY (a Corporation) et al., Ilesponclents. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Security for Costs and .Attorneys' Fees.-\Yhile Corp. Code, 
~ 83'1, requiring- stockholder in derivative action to furnish 
security for defrendants' rexpenses if trial court finds that 
there is no reasonable probability that corporation will benefit 
from action, does not eontain a eomparable provision requiring 
corporation to post for stockholder's expenses if trial 
court finds a probability that corporation will benefit, this is 
not a denial of equal protection, since stockholder will not 
incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to bring in 
equity a suit in corporation's right and, if he does bring suit, 
he knows that he, like all others in his class, will be subject 
to regulating- provisions of statute. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Judg-
ment-Costs and Counsel Fees.-Although the law does not 
[1] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Corporations, ~§ 225, 226; Am.Jur., Cor-
porations, § 471. 
McK. Dig. Reference::;: [1, 3, 5, 6, 9-14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23] Cor-
porations, § 368.5; [2] Corporations, § 368; [ 4, 8] Corporations, 
§ 353; [7] Constitutional Law, § 150; [15] Bonds, ~ 2; [18, 19] 
Corporations, § 363; [21] Motions, ~ 24(6), 
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provide for deposit of security for stockholder's expenses at 
beginning of his derivative action, it does provide for charging 
against corporation costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who 
has successfully maintained a representative action. 
[3] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to 
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition prec'edent 
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, does not un-
constitutionally discriminate against poor stockholders who 
are unable to furnish required security. 
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Regula-
tion by State.-A state may set terms on which it will permit 
litigations in its courts, and no type of litigation is more sus-
ceptible of regulation than that instituted by a volunteer plain-
tiff-fiduciary who says that he seeks to enforce derivative 
rights for a corporation which refuses to act through its board 
of directors to the end he demands. 
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Every stockholder who is un-
able to induce corporation, through its board of directors, to 
institute a particular action on its behalf, and who undertakes 
as its volunteer representative to sue on cause asserted by 
him, may be required to furnish security pursuant to Corp. 
Code, § 834; the fact that there may be individual defendants 
who are sued by corporation on causes deemed proper by it, 
rather than by a self-nominated stockholder-fiduciary on causes 
deemed proper by him, and who thus cannot have benefit of 
security, is no cause for complaint by stockholder in derivative 
action who refuses to furnish security ordered by court for 
both corporation and individual defendants. 
[6] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-It would be an abuse of dis-
cretion for trial court to make an award of costs or attorneys' 
fees in favor of a losing defendant and against a representa-
tive plaintiff in a situation where derivative suit materially 
benefited corporation. 
[7] Constitutional Law-Class Legislation-Legislative Power.-
So long as basis of classification is reasonable, the Legislature 
can provide that in various types of action only a successful 
plaintiff or appellant can recover attorneys' fees or only a de-
fendant can appeal. 
[8] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Validity of Legislation Governing.-Since there is a reason-
able basis for legislative determination that there is a prob-
ability that remedy of stockholder's derivative suit may be 
abused! and that it is not unlikely that some stockholders may 
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institute such a suit merely to gain personal advantage by 
obtaining a settlement from corporate defendant rather than 
to benefit such defendant, that determination is binding on the 
courts. 
[9] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-The Legislature, for protec-
tion of third persons who have dealt with corporation and for 
protection of its office~s and employes, can constitutionally 
require that stockholder who would act as in nature of guardian 
ad litem must, as a condition of prosecuting action on behalf 
of corporation, either show a reasonable probability that suit 
will be successful or secure payment of defendants' expenses 
should they prevail. 
[10] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to 
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent 
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, does not violate 
federal and state requirements of due process (U.S. Const., 
Amendment V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13), since it is on!~· 
1·easonable expenses in an amount to be determined by court 
on notice and hearing which plaintiff may be required to secure. 
[11] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-On motion for order requiring 
stockholder to furnish security for reasonable expenses which 
might be incurred by defendants in connection with his de-
rivative action, it is for trial court to weigh evidence and its 
finding, based on substantial conflicting evidence, is binding 
on appellate court as in every civil case. 
[12] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to 
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent 
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, was not in-
tended to be limited to strike suits, as distinguished from bona 
fide suits. 
(13] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-It was not unreasonable as a 
matter of law for trial court to require stockholder to furnish 
security of $1,000 for corporation named as defendant in 
stockholder's derivative suit, where it was proper for corpora-
tion to employ counsel and appear in proceeding, and order 
requiring deposit of such sum did not constitute a determina-
tion that that would be amount of corporation's costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees which, under Corp. Code, § 834, 
could not be determined until completion of suit. 
[14] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Order of trial court requiring 
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stockholder to furnish security of $5,000 for each of individual 
defendants in stockholder's derivatil'e suit was not so excessive 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law where, 
at time order was made, it had to be contemplated that at-
torneys for these defendants would have to defend against 
representative suit on merits at a possibly extended trial if 
plaintiff saw fit to furnish security and continue suit; where 
complaint sought not only to compel assignment of oil lease but 
also an accounting and recovery of more than $75,000 alleged 
to have been wrongfully collected and withheld by such de· 
fendants; and where possibility of services and costs on appeal 
was to be considered. 
[15] Bonds-Form and Requisites.-,Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1041, 
1057, relating to form and requisites of bond in civil actions, 
do not require acceptance of an undertaking executed by two 
residents and householders in every case where security is 
necessary; the code simply prescribes what the sureties must 
undertake and what officer taking bond must require in event 
a freeholders' bond can be and is furnished. 
[16] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corpora-
tion-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.--Corp. Code, 
§ 834, relating to security for costs and attorneys' fees as con-
dition precedent to maintenance of stockholder's derivative 
suit, does not prescribe type of security which can be required; 
it leaves matter to sound discretion of trial court. 
[17] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-'\Vhere trial court deterrninc:s 
on sufficient evidence that there is slight probability that 
stockholder's derivative suit has merit, and where from natm·e 
and multiplicity of issues involved it appears that trial might 
be extended and that counsel might have to prosecute or de" 
fend appeals, it cannot be held as a matter of law that court 
abused its discretion in requiring stockholder to furnish security 
for costs in form of cash or bonds issued by surety company. 
[18] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Parties. 
-Corporation is an indispensable party to a representative 
action brought on its behalf; its rights, not those of nominal 
plaintiff, are to be litigated, and court has no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate its rights in its absence as a party. 
[19] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Parties. 
-Dismissal of corporation at any stage in a representative 
action must result in discontinuance of action, not for mere 
defect in parties, but for lack of jurisdiction to proceed. 
[20] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Where stockholder in deriva-
tive action refused to deposit security required for corpora-
tion; the action could not continue against that indispensable 
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party, or in its absence against any other party, and trial court 
had no alternative but to dismiss as to all defendants. 
[21) Motions-Orders-Vacation-Notice of Motion.-Trial court 
is without power to set aside an order involving judicial action 
regularly made, and enter another and different order without 
notice to adverse party. 
[22) Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Purported orders 
of trial court postponing time for deposit of security required 
of stockholder in derivative suit, having been made e:x; parte, 
were ineffective. 
[23] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security 
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-\Vhere stockholder's motion 
to change form and amount of security required of him to 
maintain derivative suit is properly before court on notice and 
after argument, court has power to reconsider questions of 
appropriate amount and form of security, but whether it 
should grant or deny such motion is addressed to its sound 
discretion. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare 
County. Frank Lamberson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Stockholder's derivative action to compel individual de-
fendants to transfer an oil lease to defendant corporation, and 
for an accounting. ,Judgment of dismissal affirmed. 
Zeutzius & Steffes, A. P. G. Steffes and Jamison & Jamison 
for Appellant. 
Harry E. Templeton, Jessie Miller, Guy Knupp, Jr., and 
Burford & Hubler for Respondents. 
O'Melvcny & Myers, William W. Alsup, Philip F. West-
brook, Jr., Loeb & Loeb, Allen E. Susman, John L. Cole and 
Herman F. Selvin, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff, a stockholder of defendant Juno 
Oil Company, instituted a stockholder's derivative suit to 
compel defendants Henderson and Carpenter to transfer a 
eertain oil lease to defendant Juno Oil Company and to 
account for and pay to Juno sums reeeived under the lease 
as rents and royalties. Defendants moved, under section 834 
of the Corporations Code, for an order requiring plaintiff to 
furnish security for reasonable expenses which might be 
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incurred by defendants in connection with the action. Plain-
tiff failed to deposit security as ordered by the trial court 
and the court dismissed the action. F'rom the judgment of 
dismissal plaintiff appeals. He contends that the applicable 
portions of section 834 are unconstitutional, particularly in 
their requirement that plaintiff furnish security for the ex-
penses of individual defendants who are sued not as officers 
or employes of defendant corporation but as third persons 
who dealt with the corporation; that defendants established 
no ground for requiring any security or, in the alternative, 
that the trial court abused its discretion as to the amount and 
form of security required; and that the court erred in dis-
missing the action at a time when plaintiff's motion to modify 
the original order in respect to its requirements as to form 
and amount of security was pending. \Ve have concluded 
that each of these contentions is without merit. 
The applicable provisions of section 834 are found in para-
graph (b) thereof. They are as follows: Within 30 days 
after service of summons in a stockholder's derivative suit 
the corporation or any defendant may move for an order, 
on notice and hearing, requiring plaintiff to furnish security. 
The motion may be based on either of the following grounds: 
( 1) that there is no reasonable probability that prosecution 
of the cause of action against the moving party will benefit 
the corporation or its security holders; (2) that the moving 
party, if other than the corporation, did not participate in 
the transaction complained of in any capacity. At the hear-
ing on the motion the conrt shall consider evidence material 
to the grounds of the motion and, when material, to a deter-
mination of the probable reasonable expenses, including attor-
ney's fees, of the defense of the action. If the court deter-
mines that the moving party has established a probability 
in support of the grounds of the motion, it shall fix the 
amount and nature of security to be furnished by plaintiff 
for reasonable exprnses, including expenses for which the 
corporation may become liable under section 830 of the Cor-
portions Code.1 A determination as to the furnishing of 
security is not a determination of the merits of any issue 
in the action. ''The corporation and the moving party shall 
have recourse to such security in such amount as the court 
1Section 830 provides for indemnification by a corporation of a di-
rector, officer or employe for reasonable expenses incurred in defending 
a suit against him which is based on his alleged wrong to the corpora-
tion, if he has successfully defended or if the court finds that his conduct 
merits indemnity. 
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shall determine upon the termination of such action.'' 
The amount of security must be reasonable and may be 
changed from time to time within the court's discretion. If 
the court requires that security be furnished as to any de-
fendant, the action shall be dismissed as to such defendant 
unless the security has been furnished within a reasonable 
time fixed by the court. 
The complaint herein alleges that plaintiff, defendant Hen-
derson, and Scott Carpenter2 orally agreed that defendant 
Juno Oil Company would be organized to operate oil leases 
to be acquired by plaintiff and the individual defendants 
and transferred to the corporation in consideration of stock 
to be issued by it; that the corporation was formed and the 
stock issued; that plaintiff acquired and transferred to Juno 
certain oil leases; that the individual defendants undertook 
to and did acquire a certain oil lease, known as the Norris 
lease, but refused to transfer it to Juno as agreed; and that 
Juno, despite plaintiff's demands, refused to compel transfer 
of the Norris lease. The complaint seeks to compel transfer 
of such lease and payment to the corporation of proceeds 
therefrom allegedly received by the individual defendants for 
the benefit of the corporation. 
Each defendant moved, under section 834 of the Corpora-
tions Code, that plaintiff be required to furnish security for 
probable reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, which 
might be incurred in defending the action. The motions were 
based on the ground that there was no reasonable probability 
that prosecution of the action would benefit the corporation 
and, in the case of the individual defendants, on the further 
ground that they did not participate in the transaction com-
plained of. The trial court at the hearing of the motions 
considered substantially conflicting affidavits and testimony. 
By formal order dated August 27, 1951, the trial court or-
dered that "plaintiff shall, within thirty days from the date 
hereof, deposit" security of $5,000 as to each of the individual 
defendants and $1,000 as to Juno, in the form of cash or 
bonds of a surety company, and that if plaintiff "fails to 
2Scott Carpenter is since deceased. The administratrix of his estate 
is named as a defendant. For convenience Henderson and Carpenter 
will sometimes be referred to as the individual defendants. 
Plaintiff also joined three other individuals, directors of .r uno Oil 
Co., as defendants, but he has since dismissed his appeal as to them 
because he wishes to emphasize issues as to the application of the security 
requirement to those who assertedly wrong the corporation, not as 
officers or employes, but as strangers. 
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provide such security for any of the defendants herein, within 
the time herein provided, then upon a proper showing thereof, 
this action shall be dismissed as to any or all defendants for 
whom such security has not been given in the sums and in the 
manner as herein specified. '' 
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff obtained an ex parte order 
which purported to grant him 30 days from the date thereof 
in which to deposit the security, and on October 22, 1951, 
plaintiff obtained another ex parte order which purported 
to grant him 30 days from the date thereof in which to 
deposit the security. On October 26, 1951, plaintiff :filed a 
"Notice of Motion for Order Changing the Amount and Form 
of Security,'' by which he asked that the amount of security 
be reduced to $2,000 as to the individual defendants and 
$400 as to Juno, that plaintiff be permitted to :file an under-
taking executed by personal sureties, and that such security 
be furnished on or before December 1, 1951. 
On October 30, 1951, defendants :filed notices of motions 
to dismiss the action on the ground that plaintiff had failed 
to deposit the security required by the order of August 27, 
1951. On November 19, 1951, the motions of plaintiff to 
change the form and amount of security and of defendants 
to dismiss the action were argued and taken under submission. 
On November 27, 1951, defendant Juno Oil Company :filed 
another notice of motion to dismiss, and on November 28, 
1951, the individual defendants filed a similar notice of 
motion. These motions were heard and submitted on De-
cember 3. 
On December 14, 1951, the trial court granted the last 
mentioned motions of defendants. On December 19 the 
court denied plaintiff's motion to change the amount and 
form of security, denied without prejudice defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss of which notice had been :filed on October 30, 
and entered the judgment of dismissal from which this appeal 
is taken. 
It appears that plaintiff did not comply with any part 
of the order for security. Instead, he contends that section 
834 violates the equal protection clause of the federal Consti-
tution (Amendment XIV, § 1) and the provisions of the 
state Constitution against special laws (art. IV, § 25) and 
against special privileges and immunities (art. I, § 21). 
Fundamentally, plaintiff's arguments as to constitutionality 
are answered, either directly or by necessary implication, by 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indttsirial Loan Corp. (1949), 337 U.S. 
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541 [ 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 I;. Ed. 1528] (which upheld the con-
stitutionality of a New ,Jersey statute with a purpose similar 
to that of section 834; so far as appears, the New Jersey 
statute contained no provision as to, and the opinion does 
not discuss, individual defendants who were not officers or 
employes) and Hogan v. Ingold (1952), 38 Cal.2d 802 [243 
P.2d 1] (in which the problem as to such individual defend-
ants did not arise) ; see, also, Whitten v. Dabney (1915), 
171 Cal. 621, 631 [154 P. 312] (which did not involve the 
problem of constitutionality of the statute but which pointed 
out that "Not only should a plaintiff in such a fiduciary 
capacity [held to be equivalent to that of a guardian ad 
litem, who is not in his own right a party to the cause] be 
willing to take no act that did not first receive the sanction 
of the court of equity to which he has appealed, but, more 
than this, he is not permitted to take any act without such 
sanction"). However, inasmuch as some of the particular 
aspects of plaintiff's arguments as to the constitutionality of 
a provision for security for and possible indemnification of an 
individual defendant who is not sued as an officer or employe 
of a corporation appear to be advanced in this case for the 
first time, we give specific consideration to those aspects of 
his argumenJ;s. 
[l] 'l'he unconstitutional discrimination exists, says plain-
tiff, because section 834 requires plaintiff to furnish security 
for defendants' expenses if the trial court finds that there 
is no reasonable probability that the corporation will benefit 
from the derivative action, but does not contain a comparable 
provision requiring the corporation to post security for plain-
tiff's expenses if the trial court finds a probability that the 
corporation will benefit. This is not a denial of equal protec-
tion. As was pointed out in Hogan v. Ingold (1952), 
s~tpra, 38 Cal.2d 802, 812, ''If the power of the state over 
this type of fiduciary litigation is plenary, as the Cohen case 
states [Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (1949), 
s?tpra, 337 U.S. 541, 551], then surely such litigation is sub-
ject to regulation of the type provided by section 834. . . . 
The stockholder will not incur any liability for costs if he 
does not essay to bring in equity a suit in the corporation's 
right. If he does bring such a suit he knows that he [like 
all others in his class] will be subject to the regulating 
provisions of the statute.'' 
[2] .Although the law does not provide for deposit of security 
for plaintiff's expenses at the beginning of his action, it 
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does provide, apart from statute, for charging against the 
corporation the costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who has 
successfully maintained a representative action. (F'ox v. Hale 
& Norcross S.M. Co. (1895), 108 Cal. 475, 477 [41 P. 328]; 
Mason v. Drug, Inc. (1939), 31 Cal.App.2d 697, 702 [88 
P.2d 929]; see, also, Mann v. Superior Court (1942), 53 
Cal.App.2d 272, 282 [127 P.2d 970]; 152 A.L.R. 914.) 
Since counsel fees for maintaining the action in such a 
situation are measured in a material part by the benefits 
recovered on behalf of the corporation, and both costs and 
counsel fees are charged against the corporation and may be 
made payable out of or a lien against the fund recovered, 
there is little likelihood that a plaintiff might successfully 
maintain the action and yet be unable to collect an award 
for his expenses. 
[3] Plaintiff argues that section 834 unconstitutionally 
discriminates against poor stockholders who are unable to 
furnish the required security. But if plaintiff's argument 
in this respect were accepted then any statute which required 
the payment of a fee or the furnishing of security as a pre-
requisite to the filing of a complaint, the issuance or levying 
of a writ, the procurement of a record on appeal, etc., would 
be unconstitutional. Plaintiff relies upon Morganti v. Mor-
ganti (1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 512, 516 [222 P.2d 78] (see, 
also, Dribin v. Sttperior Court (1951), 37 Cal.2d 345, 349-350 
[231 P.2d 809, 24 A.L.R.2d 864]), where it was held that 
the right to divorce an incurably insane spouse could not 
constitutionally be limited to those who could guarantee that 
the spouse would be supported for his or her life expectancy. 
The lVIorganti case is not controlling or persuasive here; 
rather, the analogies suggested by defendants (requirement 
of filing fees, etc.) are pertinent. (See, also, Escobedo v. 
State of California (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 878 [222 P.2d 1].) 
lVIore basically, it is also pointed out that the plaintiff here is 
not seeking to enforce any personal right; rather, he is seeking 
to have the court accept his nomination of himself to act in 
a fiduciary capacity in the nature of a guardian ad litem. 
[4] As held in Cohen v. Beneficial Indttstrial Loan Corp. 
(1949), supra, 337 U.S. 541, 549 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 
1528], a state may set the terms on which it will permit 
litigations in its courts, and no type of litigation is more 
susceptible of regulation than that instituted by a volunteer 
plaintiff-fiduciary who says that he seeks to enforce derivative 
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rights for a corporation which refuses to act through its board 
of directors to the end he demands. 
[5] Section 834 is unconstitutionally discriminatory in 
another respect, says plaintiff, because if the individual de-
fendants had been sued by the defendant corporation itself, 
rather than by plaintiff stockholder in his representative 
capacity, they would not have been entitled to security. This 
effect of the statute does not create an unreasonable classifi-
cation ; every stockholder who, like plaintiff, is unable to 
induce the corporation, through its board of directors, to 
institute a particular action on its own behalf, and who under-
takes as its volunteer representative to sue on the cause as-
serted by him, may be required to furnish security. The 
fact that there may be individual defendants who are sued 
by a corporation on causes deemed proper by it, rather than 
by a self-nominated stockholder-fiduciary on causes deemed 
proper by him, and thus cannot have the benefit of security, 
is not a cause for complaint by this plaintiff. 
Plaintiff points out that if he did furnish security and 
the action were prosecuted to judgment, defendants might 
"have recourse to such security in such amount as the 
court shall determine upon the termination of such action,'' 
and that under this last quoted portion of section 834 the 
individual defendants might be allowed to recover attorneys' 
fees from plaintiff if they ultimately prevailed, whereas plain-
tiff could not recover such fees from the individual defend-
ants if he prevailed. For reasons and on the authorities 
already discussed as well as those immediately hereinafter 
summarized, there is no merit in this contention. In ex-
tension of the same point plaintiff objects, further, that if 
the quoted language is read literally the defendants, both 
corporate and individual, might be allowed to recover ex-
penses although plaintiff prevailed in the action. The present 
case has not come to the state where the last-mentioned prob-
lems would arise. [6] However, in answer to the last argu-
ment, it may be suggested that it would appear to be an abuse 
of discretion for a trial court to make an award of costs or 
attorneys' fees in favor of a losing defendant and against a 
representative plaintiff in a situation where the suit materially 
benefited the corporation. 
In support of his above stated contentions, plaintiff relies 
upon Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor (1907), 150 Cal. 
265, 268-269 [88 P. 982, 119 .Am.St.Rep. 193, 17 L.R..A.N.S. 
909], The statute under consideration there provided for 
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an award of attorneys' fees only to those who established 
their claims under the mechanics' lien law and not to those 
who successfully resisted such claims of lien. This court held, 
"A statute which gives an attorney's fee to one party in an 
action and denies it to the other, and allows such fee in one 
kind of action and not in other kinds of actions where, as in 
the statute here in question, the distinction is not founded 
on constitutional or natural differences, is clearly violative 
of the constitutional provisions above noticed [U.S. Const., 
Amendment XIV] Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 21, art. IV, 
§ 25]. '' [7] However, as the Builders' Supply case recog-
nizes and as defendants and amici curiae point out, so long 
as the basis of the classification is reasonable, the Legislature 
can provide that in various types of action only a successful 
plaintiff or appellant can recover attorneys' fees or only a 
defendant can appeal. (Missouri, K. &: T. R. Co. v. Cade 
(1914), 233 U.S. 642, 649 [34 S.Ct. 678, 58 L.Ed. 1135] 
[statute providing that any person may present to his debtor 
a bona fide claim for services rendered, material furnished, 
overcharges on or damage to freight, or injury to stock, and 
that if the debtor does not pay within 30 days such person 
can sue upon the claim and, if his suit is successful, can 
recover not only costs but also reasonable attorneys' fees] ; 
Engebretsen v. Gay (1910), 158 Cal. 30, 32 [109 P. 880, 
Ann.Cas. 1912A 690, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 1062] [Stats. 1885, p. 
147, as amended (Deering's Gen. Laws (1906), Act 3930, 
§ 12), providing that plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees 
as well as costs in successful action to recover unpaid amount 
of street assessment] ; Supe1·ior Wheeler Cake Corp. v. Su-
perior Court (1928), 203 Cal. 384, 386-387 [264 P. 488] 
[former Code Civ. Proc., § 927j (Stats. 1921, p. 120), pro-
viding that unsuccessful defendant but not unsuccessful plain-
tiff can appeal from judgment of small claims court; the court 
emphasizes that it was plaintiff who invoked the quick and 
inexpensive small claims procedure and that if plaintiff 
wished a mutual right of appeal he could have invoked the 
regular jurisdiction of the justice's court] ; Sacramento M. U. 
Dist. v. Pacific Gas &: Elec. Co. (1942), 20 Cal.2d 684, 693-
696 [128 P.2d 529] [Code Civ. Proc., § 526b, providing that 
if an unsuccessful plaintiff in a suit to enjoin the sale of 
public utility's bonds is interested in a public utility business 
of the same nature as that for which the bonds are proposed, 
such plaintiff is liable to the defendant for the costs, damages, 
and necessary expenses resulting from the suit] ; City of 
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Alhtras v. Superior Court (1940), 36 Cal.App.2d 457, 459 
[97 P.2d 816] [Code Civ. Proc., § 117j, providing that if a 
final judgment of the superior court is rendered against a 
defendant who appeals from a judgment of the small claims 
court he shall pay plaintiff an attorney's fee].) 
[8] The Ijeg·islature could determine that normally the 
officers and employes of corporations do not mismanage the 
corporation's funds, that usually if third persons deal wrong-
fully with the corporation the directors cause it to prosecute 
any proper right of action in its own name, and that it is 
not unlikely that some stockholders may abuse the remedy 
of the representative suit and institute such a suit (some-
times called a "strike suit") to gain personal advantage by 
obtaining a settlement from the corporate defendant rather 
than to benefit such defendant.3 The Legislature could fur-
ther take cognizance of the notorious fact that the bringing 
of groundless derivative suits by irresponsible persons has 
in some jurisdictions approached the character of a "racket." 
(Cohen v. Beneficial Indttstrial Loan Corp. (1949), supra, 337 
U.S. 541, 548-549; Lapchak v. Baker (1948), 298 N.Y. 89, 
94-95 [80 N.E.2d 751] .) It has been suggested that the 
representative suit has not been abused by the bringing of 
''strike suits'' in California as it has in some eastern states. 
But since there is a reasonable basis for the legislative 
determination that there is a probability that the remedy 
may be abused, that determination is binding upon the courts, 
and to assert that representative suits have not been used in 
bad faith in this state does not aid the stockholder in his 
attempt to have the legislation stricken down. (See Sacra-
ntento M. U. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1942), supra, 
20 Cal.2d 684, 694.) [9] In these circumstances the Legis-
lature, for the protection of third persons who have dealt 
with the corporation, as well as for the protection of the 
corporation and its officers and employes, can constitutionally 
require that the stockholder who would act as in the nature 
of a guardian ad litem must, as a condition of prosecuting 
the action on behalf of the corporation, either show a reason-
able probability that the suit will be successful or secure 
3 As amici curiae point out, the Legislature could also determine that 
''a plaintiff generally finds it easier to employ an attorney on a wholly 
contingent basis than does a defendant, thus not assuming any personal 
liability for fees unless he is successful, whereas a defendant will ordi-
narily have incurred such a liability regardless of the outcome of the 
case.'' 
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the payment of the defendants' expenses should they prevail. 
'l'he Legislature, of course, can attribute some weight to the 
fact that the corporation has not seen fit to institute action 
on a cause which either belongs to it or to no one. 
[10] Plaintiff argues that section 834 violates not only 
the requirement of equal protection but also the federal .and 
state requirements of due process (U.S. Const., Amend. 
V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13). This argument is answered by 
the consideration that it is only reasonable expenses in an 
amount to be determined by the court on notice and hearing 
which plaintiff may be required to secure. (See Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (1949), supra, 337 U.S. 541, 
552.) It is to be noted that the California statute is even 
less susceptible to the charge that it violates due process than 
is the New Jersey statute upheld in the Cohen case, for the 
California statute contains the safeguard, not found in the 
New Jersey statute, of a preliminary showing by defendants 
that there is no reasonable probability of benefit to the corpo-
ration from prosecution of the action. 
Plaintiff claims that defendants have not met their burden 
of proving that there is no reasonable probability that prose-
cution of the action will benefit the corporation or its se-
curity holders. The evidence on this matter is conflicting.4 
[11] "It is for the trial court to weigh the evidence and 
its finding, based upon substantial conflicting evidence, is 
in this as in every civil case binding upon the appellate 
4 There is no written memorandum representing the entire agreement 
among the parties. The factual dispute is as to whether such agreement 
(which, so far as it was carried out, required organization of the 
eorporation and issuance of shaTes to plaintiff and the individual de-
fondants in consideration of plaintiff's transferring certain oil leases 
to tho corporation and the individual defendants' paying certain sums 
to plaintiff) also required Carpenter and Henderson to acquire and 
transfer to the cmporation the Norris lease, for which they were nego-
tiating. Plaintiff testified that at a meeting of the parties prior 
to orgnnization Carpenter and Henderson agreed to transfer such lease. 
Henderson testified that at such a meeting of the parties he said he 
would not transfer his interest in the Norris lease and Carpenter 
(since deceased) stated that he wanted more time to think the 
matter over. Another individual defendant, not a respondent here, 
testified that at such meeting Henderson said he would not transfer 
the Norris lease to the company and Carpenter said that he could not 
act at the time because the lease was ''in litigation.'' Still another 
individual defendant testified that he did not recall hearing Carpenter 
say that he would transfer his interest to the company; that he said 
the lease "was under litigation ... and nothing could be done about 
it.'' Although the testimony as to the dates of the meetings referred to 
is uncertain, the trier of fact could resolve such testimony favorable 
to defendants and find that at no time did Henderson and Carpenter 
agree to transfer the Norris lease to Juno. 
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court." (Wood v. Gordon (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 374, 376 
[246 P.2d 84].) In connection with his argument that de-
fendants have not sustained their burden of proof as to 
lack of reasonable probability of benefit to the corporation 
or its security holders, plaintiff says further, "Manifestly, 
this is not such a 'strike suit' as was mentioned by the United 
States Supreme Court in its decision in the Cohen case. If 
it is not such a 'strike suit,' then the only possible reason 
for allowing security and costs for attorneys' fees entirely 
disappears.'' But the question before the trial court was not 
whether this was a ''strike suit''; the question for that court 
was whether, regardless of plaintiff's motive in instituting 
the action, there was or was not a probability of benefit to 
the corporate defendant. [12] ''The argument that the statute 
was intended and should be limited to strike suits is unavail-
ing in view of its language." (Wood v. Gordon (1952), 
supra, p. 377 of 112 Cal.App.2d.) 
Since defendants' motion for security was properly granted 
on the ground that there was no reasonable probability that 
the action will benefit the corporation, plaintiff's contention 
that the individual defendants have not shown that they ''did 
not participate in the transaction complained of" need not 
be considered. 
Plaintiff urges that the trial court abused its discretion by 
ordering that he furnish an excessive amount of security to 
Juno, Henderson, and Carpenter. As previously stated, 
plaintiff was ordered to furnish security of $1,000 for Juno 
and $5,000 each for Henderson and Carpenter. Even if 
we assume, as argued by plaintiff, that if the action is to 
be tried on its merits it is Henderson and Carpenter who 
will carry the main burden of defending the suit and that 
the corporation need not actively resist the claims of plaintiff 
(see Meyers v. Smith (1933), 190 Minn. 157, 159 [251 N.W. 
20) ; 87utzlcer v. Rieber (1942), 132 N.J.Eq. 412, 413, 415 
[28 A.2d 528]; Chaplin v. Selznic:k (1945), 186 Misc. 66 [58 
N.Y.S.2d 453, 455] ), it does not follow that the amount fixed 
as to any defendant is unreasonable and beyond the range 
of judicial discretion. Obviously, it is proper for the cor-
poration, if its position is justified at all, to employ counsel, 
appear in the proceeding by answer or otherwise, and move 
for the deposit of security for its expenses. It may be that 
if plaintiff had deposited security and the action had been 
tried, it might have developed that $1,000 would have ex-
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ceeded the amount of Juno's reasonable expenses. [13] But 
it does not appear as a matter of law that it was unreasonable 
to require security of $1,000 at the time the order was made. 
And the order that $1,000 be deposited as security does not 
constitute a determination that that will be the amount of 
Juno's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees ; plaintiff is mis-
taken in his assertion that such order ''was in effect an 
order fixing a retainer of $1,000.00 for the corporation'' ; 
under section 834 the amount of costs and attorneys' fees 
cannot be determined until the completion of the suit. 
[14] The requirement of security of $5,000 each as to 
Henderson and Carpenter does not appear so excessive (if 
excessive at all) as to constitute an abuse of discretion as 
a matter of law. At the time the order was made it had 
to be contemplated that the attorneys for those individual 
defendants would have to defend against the representative 
suit on the merits at a possibly extended trial if plaintiff 
saw fit to furnish the security and continue such suit; the 
complaint seeks not only to compel assignment of a described 
oil lease but also an accounting and the recovery of more 
than $75,000 alleged to have been wrongfully collected and 
withheld by the individual defendants; and the possibility 
of services and costs on appeal was to be considered. Perti-
nent to this subject-and tending also to derogate plaintiff's 
more basic arguments against the type of legislation here 
involved-is the fact that although no security has been fur-
nished, defendants' attorneys have already rendered substan-
tial services in the superior court on the primary and counter 
motions and on this appeal in defense of the attack made 
by plaintiff on the constitutionality of section 834 and the 
propriety of its application here. 
Plaintiff's objection to the order requiring deposit of 
security extends not only to the amount but also to the form 
of security. The superior court ordered "that said security 
shall be deposited in the form of cash or a bond or bonds 
issued by a security company authorized to issue such bonds.'' 
As already mentioned, after the making of this order plain-
tiff moved for an order changing the amount and form of 
security. In support of this motion he filed an affidavit which 
avers that although he has assets the fair market value of which 
exceeds the amount of security required, he would sustain 
financial loss by converting those assets into cash, and that 
the surety companies which execute the bonds which the court 
order permits him to furnish demand cash collateral in the 
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total amount of such bonds. It appears that before the trial 
court plaintiff emphasized the hardship to himself resulting 
from the requirement of cash, rather than the sufficiency or 
reasonableness of the form of security as a protection to the 
defendants. 
[15] On appeal plaintiff argues that the Code of Civil 
Procedure ( §§ 1041, 1057) 5 provides that wherever a bond is 
required by any law of this state it may be an undertaking 
executed by two residents and householders, or freeholders, 
within the state. There is no such requirement of the accept-
ance of an undertaking executed by personal sureties in every 
case where security is necessary; the Code of Civil Procedure 
simply prescribes what the sureties must undertake and what 
the officer taking the bond must require in the event a free-
holders' bond can be and is furnished. [16] Section 834 of 
the Corporations Code, which relates specifically to and 
controls the present proceeding, does not prescribe the type 
of security which can be required; its provision that "the 
court shall fix the nature and amount of security" leaves the 
matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. [17] Where 
the trial court determines upon sufficient evidence that there 
is slight probability that plaintiff's representative suit has 
merit and where from the nature and multiplicity of issues 
involved it appears that the trial might be an extended one, 
and that counsel might have to prosecute or defend appeals, 
we cannot hold that the court, as a matter of law, abused 
its discretion in fixing either the amounts or character of 
security here prescribed. 
It is furthermore to be observed that, regardless of the 
propriety of the order requiring deposit of security for the 
individual defendants, the judgment of dismissal is, for an-
other and independent reason, the only proper judgment 
here. Plaintiff failed and refused to furnish the security for 
the corporation as ordered. [18] The corporation is an in-
"Those sections provide in material part as follows: 
Section 1041: "Whenever a party to an action or proceeding desires 
to give an undertaking provided to be given by any statute of this 
State, it shall be sufficient if the sureties sign an undertaking indicating 
that they are bound to the obligations of the statute requiring the 
undertaking to be given. Such undertaking may be in form as fol-
lows: ... " 
Section 1057: "In any case where an undertaking or bond is author-
ized or required by any law of this State, the officer taking the same 
must ... require the sureties to accompany it with an affidavit that 
they are each residents and householders, or freeholders, within the 
State, and are each worth the sum specified in the undertaking . . . '' 
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dispensable party to a representative action brought on its 
behalf; its rights, not those of the nominal plaintiff, are to 
be litigated, and the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
its rights in its absence as a party. [19] Dismissal of the 
corporation at any stage in a representative action must result 
in a discontinuance of the action, not for a mere defect in 
parties, but for lack of jurisdiction to proceed. (Beach v. 
Cooper (1887), 72 Cal. 99, 103 [13 P. 161]; Wickersham v. 
Crittenden (1892), 93 Cal. 17, 33 [28 P. 788] ; Tu1·ner v. 
Um"ted Mineral Lands Corp. (1941), 308 Mass. 531 [33 N.E.2d 
282, 286].) [20] Therefore, when plaintiff refused to de-
posit the security required for the corporation, the action could 
not continue against that indispensable party, or in its absence 
against any other party, and the trial court had no alternative 
but to dismiss as to all defendants. 
Plaintiff contends, finally, that the court below erroneously 
dismissed the action at a time when his motion to change the 
amount and form of security was pending. As previously 
stated, the order of August 27, 1951, required that plaintiff 
deposit security within 30 days and that if he did not do so 
the action, upon proper showing, should be dismissed. Twice 
on ex parte application of plaintiff a judge signed an order 
purporting in effect to modify the original order (which 
had been regularly entered after hearing on notice) by ex-
tending the time for deposit of the security. [21] Although 
defendants have, for the purpose of argument, assumed that 
the ex parte orders might be effective, at least in part, this 
assumption is contrary to the established rule that "the trial 
court is without power to set aside an order involving judicial 
action and regularly made, and enter another and different 
order without notice to the adverse party." (Harth v. Ten 
Eyck (1941), 16 Cal.2d 829, 834 [108 P.2d 675]; Bond v. 
Fanners & Merchants Nat. Bank (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 842, 
848 [149 P.2d 722] .) [22] In this case the determination, 
and the fixing by the order, of the period which under all 
the circumstances shown would constitute a reasonable time 
for the furnishing of the security was just as much a part 
of the ''judicial action'' as was the determination and fixing 
of the amount and character of the security to be required. 
A motion seeking to amend that order in any particular which 
had been fixed as a part of judicial action could be enter-
tained only upon notice to the adverse parties. It follows that 
the purported orders postponing the time for deposit of the 
security, having been made ex parte, were ineffective. 
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[23] Plaintiff's subsequent motion to change the form 
and amount of security and the date for furnishing the same, 
hovvever, was properly before the court for disposition, upon 
notice and after <:trgument. Section 834 of the Corporations 
Code provides, ''The amount of such security may thereafter 
from time to time be increased or decreased in the discretion 
of the court upon showing that the security provided has or 
may become inadequate or is excessive.'' The trial court 
had power to reconsider the questions of the appropriate 
amount and form of security (see Harth v. TenEyck (1941), 
snpTa, pp. 833-834 of 16 Cal.2d) and it did reconsider those 
questions. Bnt whether it should grant or deny plaintiff's 
motion was a matter addressed to its sound discretion. And 
it was only after it had determined, in the exercise of that 
discretion, that the motion should be denied that, on December 
19, 1951, it entered tl1e judgment of dismissal. The fact that 
the minute order for dismissal was entered on December 14 
is immaterial. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., S11enk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
EDMONDS, .J.-I concur in the judgment upon the ground 
that the plaintiit failed to provide security for the corporation 
as ordered by the court. 
CARTER, J.--I dissent. 
It is my considered opinion that certain portions of section 
834 of the Corporations Code, as applied here, are uncon-
stitutional, particularly the requirement that plaintiff share-
holder in a derivative snit furnish security for the expenses 
of individual defendants who are sued, not as officers or 
employees of defendant corporation, but as third persons who 
dealt ·with the corporation. Such a provision is violative of 
the equal protection clanse of the federal Constitution (U. S. 
Const., .Amendment XIV, § 1) and the provisions of the Cali-
fornia Constitution against special laws (Cal. Const., art. 
IV, 25). 
Section 834 provides. that vvithin 30 days after service 
of summons in a shareholder's action the corporation or other 
defendant may move the court for an order requiring plain-
tiff shareholder to furnish security for the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees of the corporation and the 
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moving party which will be incurred in the defense of the 
action. This means that as a condition precedent to the main-
tenance of the action a stockholder plaintiff can be required 
to post security not only for the corporation's expenses but 
also for the expenses, including attorney's fees, of third party 
defendants who are neither officers, directors, nor employees 
of the corporat,ion. It is in this respect that I would hold 
the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. 
The majority recognizes the fact that this precise question 
has never yet been decided, as it states: ''However, inasmuch 
as some of the particular aspects of plaintiff's arguments 
as to the constitutionality of a provision for security for and 
possible indemnification of an individual defendant who is 
not sued as an officer or employe of a corporation appear 
to be advanced in this case for the first time we give specific 
consideration to those aspects of his arguments.'' In spite of 
this, the majority opinion proceeds to merely gloss over the 
issue by inadequately discussing the principal constitutional 
objection and then saying: ''Fundamentally, plaintiff's argu-
ments as to constitutionality are answered, either directly or 
by necessary implication, by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp . ... '' Following this statement it admits that 
the New Jersey statute, involved in the Cohen case,"( ... so 
far as appears, . . . contained no provision as to, and the 
opinion does not discuss, individual defendants who were 
officers or employes). . . . '' 
In the case of Cohen v. Beneficial Ind~~strial Loan Corp., 
supra, 337 U.S. 541, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a statute requiring security to be posted for the corpora-
tion when a shareholder brings a representative suit. The 
court there held that such a classification was a proper one 
since the shareholder can be required by state legislation 
to protect the corporation he seeks to represent. It said: 
''And while the stockholders have chosen the corporate 
director or manager, they have no such election as to a plain-
tiff who steps forward to represent them. He is a self-chosen 
representative and a volunteer champion. The Federal Con-
stitution does not oblige the state to place its litigating and 
adjudicating processes at the disposal of such a representative, 
at least without imposing standards of responsibility, liability 
and accountability which it considers will protect the interests 
he elects himself to repr·esent. (Emphasis added.) Thus it 
would appear that it may be proper for a state to require a 
stockholder plaintiff to protect the interests he is representing 
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by posting security, but this cannot be construed to mean that 
he is to protect all interests including the third party de-
fendants against whom he proceeds. The majority also cites 
Hogan v. Ingold, 38 Cal.2d 802 [243 P.2d 1], as answering 
"either directly or by necessary implication" plaintiff's argu-
ments as to the constitutionality of section 834 but it follows 
this by saying : '' (in which the problem as to such individual 
defendants did not arise). . . . " 
The majority seems to feel that it is not essential to make 
a complete study of this constitutional question as is illus-
trated by the following statement: ''. . . regardless of the 
propriety of the order requiring deposit of security for the 
individual defendants, the judgment of dismissal is, for an-
other and independent reason, the only proper judgment here. 
Plaintiff failed and refused to furnish the security for the 
corporation as ordered .... Therefore, when plaintiff refused 
to deposit the security required for the corporation, the action 
could not continue against that indispensable party, or in its 
absence against any other party, and the trial court had no 
alternative but to dismiss as to all defendants.'' This argu-
ment is misleading as it overlooks the fact that even if plain-
tiff had posted security for the corporation he still would 
not have been able to proceed against the other defendants 
without :first furnishing the security prescribed as to them. 
In view of this and the fact that grave questions of constitu-
tionality were involved, plaintiff appears to have followed a 
proper course of action by appealing from the order of dis~ 
missal. 
It is well recognized that the equal protection clause pro-
hibits discriminating and partial legislation in favor of par-
ticular persons as against others in like condition. The United 
States Supreme Court has said that: ''. . . equal protection 
and security should be given to all under like circumstances 
in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all 
persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness 
and acquire and enjoy property; that they shot(ld have like 
access to the courts of the c,ountry for the protection of their 
persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, 
and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should 
be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to 
the same pursuits by others under like circumstances ; that no 
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon 
others in the same calling and condition .... " (Emphasis 
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added; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 [5 S.Ct. 357, 
28 hEel. 923].) 
The equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature 
from setting up different requirements for different types 
and classes of litigants; however, a state legislature may not 
arbitrarily select certain individuals for the operation of its 
statutes since such selection is obnoxious to the equal pro-
tection clause. Legislation which is directed toward certain 
limited individuals and not against others can only be sus-
tained if the classification is a reasonable one based on adequate 
grounds. 
Under the provisions of section 834, a situation is presented 
where the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit may be 
required to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if he is un-
successful, but the defendant is not required to pay plaintiff's 
counsel fees if the latter wins. Such a statute gives one party 
greater rights and advantages than the other and is invalid 
unless there is some adequate reason why third party de-
fendants should receive different treatment than the plain-
tiff shareholder. No such adequate reason has been advanced 
by the majority and I am convinced the legislation is arbitrary 
and a denial of the equal protection of the law in that the 
classification is an unreasonable one. 
Discriminatory legislation of this type was held unconstitu-
tional in Bnilders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265 
[88 P. 982, 119 Am.St.Rep. 193, 17 L.R.A.N.S. 909]. In that 
case the mechanic's lien law provided for attorney's fees only 
to those who established their claim under said law and not 
to those who successfully resisted such claim of lien. In 
holding such a law unconstitutional this court (p. 268) said: 
''This provision is in our opinion violative both of the federal 
and the state constitution-of the fourteenth amendment of 
the former, which guarantees to every person 'the equal pro-
tection of the law,' and of the provisions of the state con-
stitution which provide that general laws shall be uniform, 
prohibit special laws, and declare the inalienable rights of 
all men of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property. A 
statute which gives an attorney's fee to one party in an action 
and denies it to the other, and allows such fee in one kind 
of action and not in other kinds of actions where, as in the 
statute here in question, the distinction is not founded on 
constitutional or natural differences, is clearly violative of 
the constitutional provisions above noticed." 
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If plaintiff did furnish security and the action were prose-
cuted to judgment the individual defendant, under section 
834, could recover attorney's fees from plaintiff if they pre-
vailed but plaintiff could not recover such fees from the 
individual defendants if he prevailed. What sound basis 
can there be for the provision in section 834 which gives a 
third party defendant, who is not an officer or employee of 
the defendant corporation, this preferential treatment? Merely 
because an individual defendant is sued in a derivative suit 
does not put him in any substantially different position than 
if he had been sued directly by either the corporation or by 
plaintiff and for this reason he should not be entitled to any 
special consideration. It is true that the corporation shall 
be responsible for the costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who 
has successfully maintained a shareholder's derivative suit 
but this does not remedy the situation since the plaintiff 
is still put to the disadvantage and expense of posting security 
for a defendant who is under no corresponding disadvantage. 
Even if the shareholder could ultimately prevail, this re-
quirement of an advance security for each individual de-
fendant might impose such a severe financial strain upon the 
shareholder that he would be unable to raise the money and 
consequently be unable to continue with the derivative suit. 
In the instant case the trial court required a bond of $5,000 
for each individual defendant. What if there had been 20 or 
more such defendants? How many small shareholders are 
in a position to post security bonds of $100,000 or more? 
As a practical matter a requirement of this type would keep 
most small shareholders from bringing derivative suits and 
is therefore highly discriminatory. 
It has been said that the purpose of statutes of this type 
is to protect corporations, their directors, officers and em-
ployees against so-called ''strike suits'' and the litigation 
expenses which may be unjustifiably foisted upon them; 
however the California legislation goes beyond this in that 
it imposes liability on the plaintiff for the expenses of success-
ful stranger defendants under certain conditions. 
It is frequently argued that the posting of such security 
in favor of the corporate defendant is justifiable since where 
the shareholder elects himself as the champion of the cor-
poration's cause of action he should be liable for any expenses 
which he brings about should he be unsuccessful. (See 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, 337 U.S. 
42 C.2d-2 
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541.) Such an argument is not applicable where such special 
protection is given to a third party defendant who would be 
entitled to no special consideration if he had been sued 
directly by the corporation or by an individual plaintiff. 
The mere fact that the individual defendant is sued in a de-
rivative suit does not put him at any greater disadvantage 
than if he were sued directly, and for this reason, he should 
not be entitled to special protection at the expense of the 
plaintiff shareholder. 
Even prior to 1949 the California courts recognized that 
a plaintiff must meet certain requirements in order to main-
tain a shareholder's derivative suit. Such requirements were 
found necessary to protect corporations from the so-called 
''strike suit'' or ''shakedown suit'' wherein a plaintiff sued 
primarily to harass the corporation into a pecuniary settle-
ment. The early case of Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621 
[154 P. 312], helped to remove a primary cause of the strike 
suit by holding that once commenced a stockholder plaintiff 
could compromise his suit only under the strict surveillance 
of the court. However, in 1949 with the passage of section 
834, the California Legislature went even further in the cur-
tailment of stockholder's derivative suits. The California 
legislation was in part patterned after the New York Act 
(N.Y. Gen. Corp. Laws, § 61-b) but it went far beyond its 
predecessor in the requirement that plaintiff can now be held 
liable for the expenses of successful stranger defendants under 
certain conditions. 
The primary purpose of legislation of this type has been 
said to be ''to protect corporations, their directors, officers, 
and employees against so-called 'strike suits' and the litigation 
expenses which may be unjustifiably foisted upon them." 
(Ballantine, Ab1tses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How 
Far is California's New "Semwity for Expenses" Act Sound 
Regulation? 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399.) In order to carry out this 
purpose the New York Law (N.Y. Gen. Corp. Laws, S1tpra, 
§ 61-b), the New Jersey Law (N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, §§ 3-14) 
and the Pennsylvania Law (Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, §§ 1321 
and 1323) each provides that the shareholder plaintiff post 
security for the expenses of the corporation and the other de-
fendants for whose costs the corporation may be liable (i.e., 
directors, officers and employees). However, they do not re-
quire that he post security for the expenses of third person 
defendants who are neither directors, officers nor employees 
of the corporation since the corporation which plaintiff elects 
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to represent would not be liable for such expenses. In Cali-
fornia section 834 purports to go considerably further than 
the laws of its sister states in requiring the plaintiff share-
holder to be liable for the attorney's fees of third party de-
fendants even though the corporation itself could not be held 
liable for such expenses. Such a provision is not only un-
warranted but it is a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws since it requires the plaintiff shareholder to post security 
for the third party defendant's attorney's fees without im-
posing a corresponding liability on the third party defendant. 
Some authorities hold that it is a prudent precaution to 
attempt some reasonable regulation of derivative actions to 
prevent strike suits, but I feel that the rule of Whitten v. 
Dabney, supra, 171 Cal. 621, (limiting the shareholder's right 
to settle derivative suits once commenced) and the provisions 
of section 834 requiring security for the corporation's ex-
penses are sufficient. I see no sound reason why the plaintiff 
shareholder should be further limited by having to post 
security for the expenses of third party defendants. 
Granting that some restrictions are necessary it should be 
remembered that "Great evil, however, will result if undue 
obstacles are placed in the path of a shareholder who has 
legitimate grounds for suing. The derivative action is practi-
cally the only remedy for calling the management to account 
for its wrongs against the corporation and to obtain restitu-
tion." (Ballentine, Ab1tses of Shareholders Derivative Suits, 
supm, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399, 416.) 
For these reasons I feel there is no adequate basis for the 
discriminatory provisions of section 834; that they violate 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States and constitute an undue 
impediment to the very necessary stockholder's derivative suit. 
It must be remembered that the reported decisions of this 
court show many instances in which stockholders of corpora-
tions have been defrauded and that many derivative suits have 
been meritorious. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal. 
